Dodd-Frank Under Fire

Over the weekend, Bloomberg reported:

As he prepared to sign orders designed to roll back bank regulations enacted to stop the next financial crisis, President Donald Trump said that the rules are stifling lending.

“We expect to be cutting a lot out of Dodd-Frank, because frankly I have so many people, friends of mine, that have nice businesses and they can’t borrow money,” Trump said on Friday. “They just can’t get any money because the banks just won’t let them borrow because of the rules and regulations in Dodd-Frank."

While rolling back restrictions on the financial sector seems contrary to the Trump administration's populist veneer, it is consistent with what he said he would do during the campaign.

We can expect more misleading rhetoric about "holding" capital, like this from former Goldman Sachs president Gary Cohn, who Trump has appointed director of the National Economic Council:

“Every place a bank needs to hold capital and they need to retain capital prohibits them from lending,” Cohn said in the interview. “So we’re going to attack all aspects of Dodd-Frank.”

As the article (admirably) explains:

Banks don’t actually “hold” capital. In banking, capital refers to the funding they receive from shareholders. Every penny of it can be loaned out. A 5 percent minimum capital requirement means that 5 percent of the bank’s liabilities has to be equity, while the rest can be deposits or other borrowing. The more equity a bank has, the smaller its risk of failing when losses pile up.

On their blog, Cecchetti and Schoenholtz summarize findings that higher capital not detrimental to lending.

Its not clear that Congress will undertake a full repeal of Dodd-Frank, but there are plenty of ways it can be weakened.  Brookings' Robert Pozen outlines some of the things that may happen.  At Vox, Matthew Yglesias argues that Dodd-Frank has been successful.  This paper by Martin Baily, Aaron Klein and Justin Schardin provides a more detailed assessment of its provisions.  John Cochrane has favorable views of some of the Republican alternatives, though its far from certain that there will be action on them.

The administration is also halting the Labor Department's "fiduciary rule," which requires investment advisors to act in the interest of their clients.  Cohn's defense of this action seems rather strained:

"I don't think you protect investors by limiting choices," said Cohn, who previously was Goldman Sachs' COO.

"We think it is a bad rule. It is a bad rule for consumers," Cohn told The Wall Street Journal. "This is like putting only healthy food on the menu, because unhealthy food tastes good but you still shouldn't eat it because you might die younger."

See columns by Steve Rattner, Paul Krugman and Mike Konczal.

Overall, the administration's approach to financial regulation may have short-run benefits to the financial industry, and its not surprising that financial stocks largely drove the gains in the stock market after the election.

Looser reins and more profits on Wall Street also likely mean bigger bonuses - before the crisis, financial industry compensation had been a substantial contributor to widening income inequality, and that trend seems likely to resume.

Rolling back or watering down Dodd-Frank also will increase the likelihood of another financial crisis, which we should know all too well from recent experience can have severe negative effects on the economy as a whole - from January 2008 through December 2009, nonfarm payrolls dropped by 8.6 million before beginning an agonizingly slow recovery.

Trashing the fiduciary rule and increasing the likelihood of future financial crises will also be detrimental to Americans' efforts to save for their retirements.  While there's been a short-run boost to financial shares, overall, the risk of severe losses is increased, as is the likely proportion of savings that will be eaten up by fees.  That is, Americans will be poorer and less financially secure in their old age.

Populism, indeed.

Update (2/12): CNBC's Ylan Mui reports on efforts by Jeb Hensarling, chair of the House Financial Services Cmte., to go after the CPFB.  The NYT has an op-ed by Vanguard founder John Bogle on the fiduciary rule.  Meanwhile, at the Fed, Daniel Tarullo, who has led efforts on regulation, is stepping down from the board, causing financial stocks to jump.

Revisiting Lehman

The eighth anniversary of the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank is coming up later this month.  It marked a point where the financial crisis, which had been simmering since summer 2007, seemed to go from bad to catastrophic.

One indicator of financial stress that we were all watching closely at the time was the "TED Spread" - the difference between the 3-month LIBOR (a rate on interbank loans) and the yield on 3-month US Treasuries - essentially a measure of the risk premium paid by financial institutions, which is normally quite low.

The blue line is drawn at Sept.15, 2008, the date of the Lehman Bankruptcy.

The Fed creatively expanded its "Lender of Last Resort" toolkit during the crisis, creating a number of new lending programs.  In March, it helped arrange the takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase.

Monday-morning quarterbacking of the government's actions (both the Fed's the Treasury's) began immediately and has never really stopped (academic macroeconomists consider it part of our jobs, after all).  One of the biggest questions has been why didn't Lehman Brothers get the same treatment as Bear Stearns?

The Fed did try to arrange a takeover by a healthier firm - a potential deal with Barclays was reportedly scuppered by British regulators - but no deal was finalized in time.  At the time, "moral hazard" concerns were prominent, and people felt the US government wanted to show that it was willing to let a financial institution fail.  Lehman's troubles were well-known, so it was hoped that the financial disruption would be modest since everyone had time to prepare for its demise.  More recently, officials have claimed that the Fed lacked the legal authority to rescue Lehman because it was truly insolvent - the intention of lender of last resort is to lend to illiquid banks, not insolvent ones (the Fed's loans are supposed to be backed by good collateral).

Laurence Ball of Johns Hopkins has dug into the records and is questioning the argument that the Fed did all it could (and should) have.  In a summary at VoxEU, he writes:

I conclude that officials’ explanation for the non-rescue of Lehman is incorrect, in two senses.
First, a perceived lack of legal authority was not the reason for the Fed’s inaction; and
Second, the Fed did in fact have the authority to rescue Lehman.
I base these broad conclusions on several findings, given below.

• First, before the bankruptcy, Fed staff extensively analysed Lehman’s liquidity risk and how the Fed might assist the firm. In the record of these discussions, there is little concern about the adequacy of Lehman’s collateral, and nobody suggests that legal issues might preclude a Fed loan.
• Second, arguments about legal authority made by policymakers since the bankruptcy are unpersuasive. These arguments involve flawed economic reasoning, such as confusion between the concepts of illiquidity and insolvency. They also include factual claims that are not supported by evidence. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission repeatedly asked Ben Bernanke for details about Lehman’s collateral problem, but Bernanke was unresponsive.

Further, from a de novo examination of Lehman’s finances, it is clear that the firm had ample collateral for a loan to meet its liquidity needs. In particular, I estimate that Lehman could have survived with $88 billion of overnight lending from the Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), and the firm had at least $131 billion of assets that were acceptable as PDCF collateral.

Ball's argument was also discussed in a column by James Stewart in the New York Times.

In a Bloomberg View column, Barry Ritholtz disagrees with Ball's argument that Lehman was solvent, but, nonetheless, he thinks it could have rescued Lehman:

As subsequent events have shown, most especially with the Fed-led bailout of insurance giant American International Group, if there was a will, there most certainly was a way. Given all of the various bailouts of dubious legality, the Fed, Treasury and Congress most certainly could have devised a rescue plan for the 158-year old bank.

Even though he thinks Lehman could have been rescued, on the question of whether it should have, Ritholtz disagrees with Ball and believes that the Fed was correct to let it go:

No, Lehman Brothers did not “precipitate” the financial crisis. The better metaphor is that Lehman was the first trailer in the park to be destroyed by the tornado. Whether it lived or died was not going to stop the financial forces that had been decades in the making and unleashed when the credit bubble popped.

I agree with Ann Rutledge, a principal with New York-based R&R Consulting, and co-author of two books on structured finance. She noted “It wasn’t a mistake to let Lehman fail, it was a mistake to let it live so long.”

I haven't yet tackled Ball's monograph - perhaps that would be a good project for my Money and Banking students in block 5...

Is Euro-geddon Nigh?

 Brad DeLong writes on the value of studying economic history:

Ten years ago I thought that my curiosity about and interest in the Great Depression was an antiquarian diversion from my day job of understanding the interaction of economic institutions, economic policies, and economic outcomes. The fact that we had gone through the Great Depression, had learned lessons from it, and had incorporated those lessons into our institutions and policy processes meant that there was little practical use to going over it once again. Boy, was I wrong. History may not repeat itself, but it certainly does rhyme—and nothing made an economist better-prepared and better-positioned to understand what happened to the world economy between 2007 and 2013 than a deep and comprehensive knowledge of the history of the Great Depression.

One of the most basic lessons from the 1930's, as well as the semi-regular banking panics of the 19th century, is the importance of preventing bank runs.  This can be accomplished by providing a mechanism, such as deposit insurance, that makes depositors confident that they will always be able to get their money out - therefore they won't feel an urgent need to take it out at the first sign of trouble.

Even though its been evident for a while that Europe, or at least its "leaders", seem determined to forget (or ignore) the lessons of economic history, what they're doing with Cyprus is rather stunning.  Neil Irwin writes:

It is a bad day to have your money deposited in a bank in the Mediterranean island nation of Cyprus. And it may just mean some bad days ahead for the rest of us.

Early Saturday, the nation reached an agreement with international lenders for bailout help. Part of the agreement: Bank depositors with more than 100,000 euros ($131,000) in their accounts will take a 9.9 percent haircut. Even those with less in savings will see their accounts reduced by 6.75 percent. That’s right: Anyone with money in a Cypriot bank will have significantly less money when the banks open for business Tuesday than they did on Friday. Cypriots have reacted with this perfectly rational reaction: lining up at ATM machines to try to get as much money out in the form of cash before the money they have in their accounts is reduced.

The Economist's "Schumpeter" blog further explains some of the ways in which this move is problematic:

The bail-out appears to move Europe further away from the institutional reforms that are needed to resolve the crisis once and for all. Rather than using the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks, and thereby weaken the link between banks and their governments, the euro zone continues to equate bank bail-outs with sovereign bail-outs. As for debt mutualisation, after imposing losses on local depositors, the price of support from the rest of Europe is arguably costlier now than it ever has been.

It is also hard to square this outcome with the ongoing overhaul of finance. The direction of efforts to improve banks’ liquidity position is to encourage them to hold more deposits; the aim of bail-in legislation planned to come into force by 2018 is to make senior debt absorb losses in the event of a bank failure. The logic behind both of these reform initiatives is that bank deposits have two, contradictory properties. They are both sticky, because they are insured; and they are flighty, because they can be pulled instantly. So deposits are a good source of funding provided they never run. The Cyprus bail-out makes this confidence trick harder to pull off.

Prophecies of impending Euro-doom over the past several years have repeatedly been wrong (or premature, at least), but this doesn't look good.  How many hours until banks open in Spain?

Update: According to the FT, it was the IMF that had been pushing the idea of "depositor haircuts" - I'd thought they were a little more enlightened, but apparently not...

See also: Karl Whelan,  Felix Salmon, David Beckworth, Paul Krugman.

Who Bails Out the IMF?

Us, says Simon Johnson:

Over the weekend, the monetary fund became a lot more leveraged — that is, its debt increased relative to its equity. The potential future liability to American taxpayers went up, because the risk of large credit losses increased, and those losses would need to be covered by shareholders (and the American stake in the fund is 17.69 percent of quota, with 16.8 percent of the votes).

There is also an implicit guarantee — arguably without limit — from the United States to the monetary fund. The United States set up the world trading system after World War II, and has a huge amount to lose if it fails. It also has deep pockets, compared with almost all other countries.

Therefore, unlike those at a typical corporation, the shareholders in the International Monetary Fund do not have limited liability, so we should care a great deal about the downside risks. The Europeans are currently increasing those risks — by lending to the fund and planning to use fund loans as part of future bailouts.

It hadn't occurred to me to worry about that.  Darn those "implicit guarantees"...

But this one seems very different from the implicit guarantees of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and "too big to fail" financial institutions that have made so much trouble.  When a government "bails out" a financial institution, it is really bailing out the financial institution's creditors.   Often those creditors are other financial institutions (who might be their counterparties on various transactions), or creditors of other financial institutions (e.g. a money market mutual fund that buys bank debt), so the government feels the need to rescue them because of a broader concern about "systemic risk" to the entire financial system.

The IMF's creditors, on the other hand, are governments.  If the IMF were to become insolvent, it would be a diplomatic issue, since governments would stand to lose money, but I'm not sure it would be such a problem for the world financial system.  How much - beyond the money the US has put into it - the US would have to lose if the IMF fails is not immediately obvious to me.  While a failure wouldn't spark an immediate financial crisis in the conventional way (though no doubt everyone would be pretty spooked!), how much worse off one thinks the world would be without the IMF depends on how much good you believe the IMF does.  And that is something people can (and do) debate.

Kittens are Cute

In chapter 12 of The General Theory, Keynes made a famous analogy:

[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.

NPR's Planet Money decided to put this to a test.  They posted three cute animal videos - a loris, a kitten and a baby polar bear - on their website (videos here).  One group of people was asked to vote on which was the cutest (i.e., to make a judgment about "fundamentals"), while the other voted on which was most likely to be voted cutest (to be the "speculators" in the market). The first group voted for the kitten, which received 50% (vs. 27% for the loris and 23% for the bear), and the second group also favored the kitten, by 76%.

That's a clever test, but if prices in financial markets played out like this example, then there wouldn't be a problem - the speculators are moving the market towards the correct fundamental value (that kittens are cutest).  Indeed, the speculators get it right more decisively than the fundamental investors.

That's not the point Keynes was trying to make.  He was very skeptical of the workings of financial markets.  In the same chapter, Keynes wrote:

The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made. Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some years hence is usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence. In fact, those who seriously attempt to make any such estimate are often so much in the minority that their behaviour does not govern the market.

I think that indicates a weakness of the experiment - there really is no uncertainty that kittens are cute, or that kittens will be cute in the future, so the market can get that one right pretty easily.

Personally, though, I liked the polar bear.

Cowen on Finance and Inequality

In his American Interest essay, "The Inequality That Matters," Tyler Cowen offers a number of reasons not to be too troubled by the general rise in income inequality over the last 30 years (not surprising given his generally libertarian-ish outlook).  As he notes, much of the increase in inequality is really occuring within the top 1% of incomes, and much of that is driven by the financial sector.  That, according to Cowen, is where the real problem lies. Along the way he also offers one of the best nutshell explanations for why financial sector incomes exploded to such monsterous proportions:

The first factor driving high returns is sometimes called by practitioners “going short on volatility.” Sometimes it is called “negative skewness.” In plain English, this means that some investors opt for a strategy of betting against big, unexpected moves in market prices. Most of the time investors will do well by this strategy, since big, unexpected moves are outliers by definition. Traders will earn above-average returns in good times. In bad times they won’t suffer fully when catastrophic returns come in, as sooner or later is bound to happen, because the downside of these bets is partly socialized onto the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and, of course, the taxpayers and the unemployed. 

Furthermore,

To this mix we can add the fact that many money managers are investing other people’s money. If you plan to stay with an investment bank for ten years or less, most of the people playing this investing strategy will make out very well most of the time. Everyone’s time horizon is a bit limited and you will bring in some nice years of extra returns and reap nice bonuses. And let’s say the whole thing does blow up in your face? What’s the worst that can happen? Your bosses fire you, but you will still have millions in the bank and that MBA from Harvard or Wharton. For the people actually investing the money, there’s barely any downside risk other than having to quit the party early. Furthermore, if everyone else made more or less the same mistake (very surprising major events, such as a busted housing market, affect virtually everybody), you’re hardly disgraced. You might even get rehired at another investment bank, or maybe a hedge fund, within months or even weeks. 

Like Keynes said:

A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.

Back to Cowen:

In short, there is an unholy dynamic of short-term trading and investing, backed up by bailouts and risk reduction from the government and the Federal Reserve. This is not good. “Going short on volatility” is a dangerous strategy from a social point of view. For one thing, in so-called normal times, the finance sector attracts a big chunk of the smartest, most hard-working and most talented individuals. That represents a huge human capital opportunity cost to society and the economy at large. But more immediate and more important, it means that banks take far too many risks and go way out on a limb, often in correlated fashion. When their bets turn sour, as they did in 2007–09, everyone else pays the price.

$700 Billion Bailout Update

From the Congressional Budget Office, another downward revision to the estimated cost of that "$700 Billion Bailout":

CBO estimates that the cost to the federal government of the TARP’s transactions (also referred to as the subsidy cost), including grants that have not been made yet for mortgage programs, will amount to $25 billion. That cost stems largely from assistance to American International Group (AIG), aid to the automotive industry, and grant programs aimed at avoiding mortgage foreclosures: CBO estimates a cost of $45 billion for providing those three types of assistance. Other transactions will, taken together, yield a net gain of $20 billion to the federal government, CBO estimates.

It was not apparent when the TARP was created two years ago that the costs would be this low. 

Indeed.  And I don't think its apparent to most people now that the costs were this low (which is a real problem, as I discussed in this previous post).

TARP: A Failure to Communicate

The Times reports that the estimated cost of TARP (a.k.a. "the bank bailout") has been revised downwards yet again:

Treasury reckons that taxpayers will lose less than $50 billion at worst, but at best could break even or even make money. Its best-case assumptions, however, assume that A.I.G. and the auto companies will remain profitable and that Treasury will get a good price as it sells its corporate shares in coming years. 

The Treasury has come out ahead on the money invested in the banking system - for example, it is making a profit on its investment in Citigroup.  The losses, if there are any, will come from the investments in the auto industry, and in AIG (which has announced a plan for unwinding its government ties).

The reality is certainly far different from the widespread perception that the government simply gave away $700 billion to Wall Street.  The failure to get the facts through people's thick skulls out appears to have had significant political consequences - would there be a "tea party" without this persistent misconception?  The Times story provides an example of the political consequences of this ignorance:

Among those who voted for the program in 2008, several Republicans have lost nominating contests for re-election or for another office, and others are on the defensive in fall races. Senator Robert F. Bennett of Utah was “Bailout Bob” to Republicans who refused to re-nominate him for a fourth term.
“For those who were screaming at me — and screaming was the operative word — ‘You’ve just saddled our children and grandchildren with $700 billion,’ I said, ‘No, I haven’t,” Mr. Bennett said in an interview.
“My career is over,” he added. “But I do hope that we can get the word out that TARP, number one, did save the world from a financial meltdown and, number two, did so in a manner that, I believe, won’t cost the taxpayer anything. And even if it did not all get paid back, it was still the thing to do.”

However, it should be noted that, while the financial cost of TARP will be much less than people think, the taxpayer is on the hook for some other costs because of the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae (an indirect bank bailout).  The real cost, Simon Johnson argues, is that TARP (and the Dodd-Frank financial regulation bill) failed to create an incentive structure that will prevent financial crises.  He writes:

The first draft of its history, looking back over the past two years, may be this: TARP was an essential piece of a necessary evil – that is, it saved the American financial system from collapse — but it was implemented in a way that was excessively favorable to the very bankers who had presided over the collapse. And this sets up exactly the wrong incentives as we head into the next credit cycle.

He may be right.  But, for now, we are getting most of the money back, and our politics would be significantly different if people understood that much.

Richard on Dodd-Frank

In the Hartford Courant, my colleague Richard Grossman discusses the recently enacted financial regulation bill. Overall, he thinks it strikes a good balance:

Reimposing Depression-era constraints on banking would be the equivalent of setting a 25 mph speed limit on I-95. The accident rate would surely fall, but cost to commuters would be enormous.

Our best hope of avoiding a recurrence of the financial turbulence of the last few years is an improved regulatory structure, which the Dodd-Frank legislation will deliver if the new regulators adopt sensible rules, combined with effective and sustainable macroeconomic policies.

Of course, that's a big if...

Keynes on Casino Capitalism

In the Times, Roger Lowenstein considers "How Wall Street Became a Giant Casino," which, yet again, reminds me of ch. 12 of the General Theory, in which Keynes says:

Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism - which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street have been in fact directed towards a different object.

A Bad State for Finance?

The main economic argument that the proliferation of financial derivatives has been beneficial is that it has moved us closer to the theoretical world of "complete markets" where agents can insure themselves fully against idiosyncratic risk. That is, we can make arrangements to make payments in the circumstances where we are well-off in exchange for receiving them when we are badly-off. For example, commodities futures markets allow farmers to insure against swings in the prices of their crops by locking in a price in advance (so the farmer loses some of the upside of a price increase, but avoids the downside of a price decrease). By doing so, welfare is improved, because we are reducing our consumption when it is high (and marginal utility is low) and increasing it when it is low (and marginal utility is high). That is, the "consumption smoothing" logic of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis that holds over time also applies across different states of the world. If financial assets are traded that pay off for each possible state, then markets are said to be "complete."

However, at his Maverecon blog, Willem Buiter argues that derivatives markets have strayed far from their insurance purpose, and that they do involve real resource costs and, in some cases, create, rather than reduce economic inefficiency. Following his suggestion to curb these markets would be consistent with Paul Krugman's recent argument that the economy would benefit if we return to a world where finance is boring (and less remunerative). Ivy League seniors appear to see that change coming, as the Times reports their preferences are shifting away from finance as a career.

The Japan Precedent

Much of the debate over how well - or poorly - the administration and Fed are dealing with the financial crisis centers on comparisons to the Japanese crisis of the 1990's. In the latest iteration of that debate, The Economist's Free Exchange frets that we are repeating Japan's mistakes (as does Krugman), but James Surowiecki continues to think the comparison is strained.

The Geithner Plan

The administration's plan to shore up banks sector by lending money to funds that will buy some of their sketchy securities and atrocious assets continues to get mixed reviews.... Joe Stiglitz does not like it, but Martin Feldstein thinks its a good start.

Mikey Likes It!

The markets liked the Treasury plan. As Jonathan Chait reminds us, this doesn't necessarily mean much; the anxious fretting over market reactions to policy announcements reminds me of this:



However, Free Exchange argues there is a placebo effect:

It isn't clear to me why markets are up some 6% today. Or rather, it's clear to me that they're up because of the Treasury plan, but it's not clear why they're up because of the Treasury plan. It's also not clear to me that it matters. Tonight, every newscaster in America will say, more or less, the following words: markets were up strongly today on expectations that the Treasury's banking plan will succeed. Who cares what Mr Geithner was saying on CNBC this afternoon when the Dow added 500 points on the news?

If people become convinced that a plan will work, they'll begin to make bets based on expectations that the plan will work, which will make the plan work regardless of what the plan is. I don't know whether the rally will stick or not, and the broader economy will follow its slow path toward eventual recovery in any case, but this certainly has the potential to change the psychological dynamic that had prevailed, of lost confidence in Mr Geithner and in the banking system. And that would have to be considered a big win for the Obama administration.

Or, we might say there are multiple equilibria, and the new "confidence" shifts us to a better one.

Still, I am more concerned with Paul Krugman's reaction, and he doesn't like it. But Brad DeLong is more hopeful, as is Steven Pearlstein.

Secretary Geithner explained the plan in the WSJ, and there is more at the Treasury's web site.

Rotten AIG

The government is shoveling more money into the maw of AIG. The Times' Joe Nocera explains that this is really a bailout of the banks that purchased insurance in the form of credit default swaps from AIG. Its all about the "systemic risk." On his blog, he writes:

[T]he reason A.I.G. is being propped up is that the government fears that if the company defaulted the counterparties would suddenly be faced with tens of billions of dollars worth of unacknowledged losses — and they would go bust. It would make the Lehman fiasco look like a garden party.

He explains further in this column. The Baseline Scenario has a chronology of AIG's bailouts, so far. See also Felix Salmon, Justin Fox.

Turning Japanese?

Paul Krugman, among others, really thinks so. But the Curious Capitalist points us to Foreign Affairs, where Richard Katz argues that we are not repeating Japan's mistakes:

The consequences of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis will be different from Japan's slump in the 1990s for three reasons: the cause of the current crisis is fundamentally different, its scope is far smaller, and the response of policymakers has been quicker and more effective...

The Japanese and U.S. crises differ in many ways, but the starkest contrast is in the response of policymakers. Denial, dithering, and delay were the hallmarks in Tokyo. It took the Bank of Japan nearly nine years to bring the overnight interest rate from its 1991 peak of eight percent down to zero. The U.S. Federal Reserve did that within 16 months of declaring a financial emergency, which it did in August 2007. It has also applied all sorts of unconventional measures to keep credit from drying up.

It took Tokyo eight years to use public money to recapitalize the banks; Washington began to do so in less than a year. Worse yet, Tokyo used government money to help the banks keep lending to insolvent borrowers; U.S. banks have been rapidly writing off their bad debt. Although Tokyo did eventually apply many fiscal stimulus measures, it did so too late and too erratically to have a sufficient impact. The U.S. government, by contrast, has already applied fiscal stimulus, and the Obama administration is proposing a multiyear program totaling as much as five to six percent of U.S. GDP. When it comes to crisis management, it is far better to do too much than too little.

Irving Fisher!

The financial crisis and recession have renewed interest in Irving Fisher's "debt deflation" theory, a scary portent indeed.... At Vox, Enrique Mendoza offers "Crisis Lessons from Irving Fisher," and he gets a profile in The Economist:

[Fisher] described debt deflation as a sequence of distress-selling, falling asset prices, rising real interest rates, more distress-selling, falling velocity, declining net worth, rising bankruptcies, bank runs, curtailment of credit, dumping of assets by banks, growing distrust and hoarding.

So, is the "Minsky Moment" to be followed by an "Irving Fisher Interlude"? We can count on Ben Bernanke, whose own academic work on the "financial accelerator" follows in Fisher's footsteps, to continue to use all the tools he has - and all that he can dream up - to make sure it isn't.

Update: Krugman is also thinking about Fisher.

Zombies: First, We'll Try to Outrun Them

The (sketch of a) plan unveiled by Treasury Secretary Geithner last week left many unimpressed. The main line of criticism is that many of the large banks are insolvent, if their assets are valued at market prices, and that the US should bite the bullet now with a more decisive intervention (e.g., nationalization). Failure to do so means that the economy will be burdened, Japanese-style, by a "zombie" banking sector that does not supply the credit the economy needs.

There are two countries who have gone through some big financial crises over the last decade or two. One was Japan, which never really acknowledged the scale and magnitude of the problems in their banking system and that resulted in what's called "The Lost Decade." They kept on trying to paper over the problems. The markets sort of stayed up because the Japanese government kept on pumping money in. But, eventually, nothing happened and they didn't see any growth whatsoever.

Sweden, on the other hand, had a problem like this. They took over the banks, nationalized them, got rid of the bad assets, resold the banks and, a couple years later, they were going again.

That's, um... President Obama... (via Felix Salmon) who went on to explain why we won't be following the Swedish model:

So you'd think looking at it, Sweden looks like a good model. Here's the problem; Sweden had like five banks. [LAUGHS] We've got thousands of banks. You know, the scale of the U.S. economy and the capital markets are so vast and the problems in terms of managing and overseeing anything of that scale, I think, would -- our assessment was that it wouldn't make sense. And we also have different traditions in this country.

Obviously, Sweden has a different set of cultures in terms of how the government relates to markets and America's different. And we want to retain a strong sense of that private capital fulfilling the core -- core investment needs of this country.

And so, what we've tried to do is to apply some of the tough love that's going to be necessary, but do it in a way that's also recognizing we've got big private capital markets and ultimately that's going to be the key to getting credit flowing again.

Matthew Richardson and Nouriel Roubini make the case for nationalization in a Washington Post op-ed, concluding: "We have used all our bullets, and the boogeyman is still coming. Let's pull out the bazooka and be done with it." At Naked Capitalism, Yves Smith has scathing assessment of Geithner's plan (Mussolini, really?!).

However, the banking sector has come through periods of crisis before, without such drastic measures, and without dragging down the economy. This useful analysis by the Times discusses that alternative:

Raghuram G. Rajan, a professor of finance and an economist at the University of Chicago graduate business school, draws the distinction between “liquidation values” and those of calmer times, or “going concern values.” In a troubled time for banks, Mr. Rajan said, analysts are constantly scrutinizing current and potential losses at the banks, but that is not the norm.

“If they had to sell these securities today, the losses would be far beyond their capital at this point,” he said. “But if the prices of these assets will recover over the next year or so, if they don’t have to sell at distress prices, the banks could have a new lease on life by giving them some time.”

That sort of breathing room is known as regulatory forbearance, essentially a bet by regulators that time will help heal banking troubles. It has worked before.

In the 1980s, during the height of the Latin American debt crisis, the total risk to the nine money-center banks in New York was estimated at more than three times the capital of those banks. The regulators, analysts say, did not force the banks to value those loans at the fire-sale prices of the moment, helping to avert a disaster in the banking system.

Brad DeLong has some pithy notes on the Geithner plan. Apparently, that screaming CNBC guy likes it (Alexander Hamilton, really?!).

While the Japanese experience has useful lessons, Dean Baker reminds us of some important differences:

[B]anks play a much less central role in providing capital in the U.S. economy. For example, most mortgages are financed through securitized mortgage pools. The same is true of car loans and other types of consumer debt. Large corporations typically obtain short-term capital by selling commercial paper on the market. The Fed and Treasury have taken steps to ensure that this route of obtaining capital is open, which means that the problems of the banks will have less consequence for the U.S. economy than was the case for Japan.

Update: See also Joe Nocera, who is pro-nationalization.
Update #2: Krugman, too.

New Banks?

The Obama administration is due to announce tomorrow what it will do with the second half of the the $700 bn financial sector rescue pot (a.k.a. the TARP). Rather than continuing to put more money into our troubled banks, Paul Romer and Willem Buiter argue for starting new ones. Romer says:

The government has $350 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds that it can use to encourage new bank lending. If this money is directed to newly created good banks with pristine balance sheets, it could support $3.5 trillion in new lending with a modest 9-to-1 leverage. Right out of the gate, the newly created banks could do what the Fed has already been doing -- buying pools of loans originated by existing banks that meet high underwriting standards.

And:

The brewing backlash against the existing players from the financial sector is almost certain to burn hotter as the recession wears on, and new election campaigns get underway. If the new administration ties its fate to the existing players, it could lose its room to maneuver on countercyclical policy and be put under political pressure to intervene in bank decisions in ever more intrusive ways.

Because they can and will borrow, new banks will be much more effective in leveraging TARP funds. They will undertake more total lending, bring more trading to financial markets, and do more to limit the depth of the recession. As a result, investing the TARP funds in new banks will do more to help the troubled but potentially viable existing banks than giving funds directly to them.

Banks that are not viable, the ones with liabilities that substantially exceed their assets, will lobby vociferously against a return to historical patterns of bank regulation. They will say anything to postpone a looming FDIC takeover. The administration should not listen to threats and pleas from these doomed banks. It does not have to rely on them to get new lending going quickly and on a large scale. New entrants could give us a few good banks. That, plus an FDIC that can do its job, is all we need.

Update: A counterargument from Felix Salmon.

A Crisis of Animal Spirits

In the WSJ, Yale's Robert Shiller argues for the relevance of the Keynes beyond the "textbook" Keynesian model:

The term "animal spirits," popularized by John Maynard Keynes in his 1936 book "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," is related to consumer or business confidence, but it means more than that. It refers also to the sense of trust we have in each other, our sense of fairness in economic dealings, and our sense of the extent of corruption and bad faith. When animal spirits are on ebb, consumers do not want to spend and businesses do not want to make capital expenditures or hire people...

But lost in the economics textbooks, and all but lost in the thousands of pages of the technical economics literature, is this other message of Keynes regarding why the economy fluctuates as much as it does. Animal spirits offer an explanation for why we get into recessions in the first place -- for why the economy fluctuates as it does. It also gives some hints regarding what we need to do now to get out of the current crisis...

The famous phrase comes from this passage in chapter 12 of the General Theory:

Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits - of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities. Enterprise only pretends to itself to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die; - though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes of profit had before.