Glasnost!

Ben Bernanke will be meeting the press, the Fed announced:

Chairman Ben S. Bernanke will hold press briefings four times per year to present the Federal Open Market Committee's current economic projections and to provide additional context for the FOMC's policy decisions.

In 2011, the Chairman's press briefings will be held at 2:15 p.m. following FOMC decisions scheduled on April 27, June 22 and November 2. The briefings will be broadcast live on the Federal Reserve's website. For these meetings, the FOMC statement is expected to be released at around 12:30 p.m., one hour and forty-five minutes earlier than for other FOMC meetings.

The introduction of regular press briefings is intended to further enhance the clarity and timeliness of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy communication. The Federal Reserve will continue to review its communications practices in the interest of ensuring accountability and increasing public understanding. 

Wow.  It wasn't too long ago that I remember watching one of Bank of England Governor Mervyn King's press conferences and thinking "that will never happen here."

This is another step that follows from a significant evolution in what is seen as good practice by central banks.  The Fed and other central banks once believed in the importance of using secrecy to cultivate a mystique.  It was not for nothing that William Grieder titled his 1987 classic about the Fed "Secrets of the Temple."  The Fed only began announcing changes in its policy stance in 1994, announcements of explicit Fed Funds rate targets followed in 1995.

This trend towards openness partly reflects the influence of academic views, as modern macroeconomic models assign important roles to expectations, information and credibility (which can be cultivated by making policy announcements and then sticking to them).  Its not surprising to see Bernanke pushing in this direction, given his background as a prominent academic economist (in contrast to his predecessor).  The previous procedural step in this direction was in November 2007, when Bernanke instituted the practice of having the FOMC members release their forecasts.  Bernanke also appeared on 60 minutes last December, which would have been unthinkable to the previous generation of central bankers.

Update: Real Time Economics has reaction from some Fed watchers and a chronology of the Fed's increasing openness.

DeLong on Friedman

Although it was once considered the big divide in macroeconomics, contemporary "Keynesianism" and "Monetarism" may not be so far apart (some would argue that's because modern "New Keynesians" aren't really Keynesians at all, but I digress...).  These days, they are mostly on the same side in arguing that policy can do something (other than damage) to smooth economic fluctuations and, by extension, persistent high unemployment is a policy failure.

This reveals a contradiction between how Milton Friedman is perceived and what his ideas really meant, Brad DeLong explains:

In the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s Milton Friedman faced a rhetorical problem. He was a laissez-faire libertarian. But he also believed that macroeconomic stabilization required that the central bank be always in the market, buying and selling government bonds in order to match the supply of liquid cash money to the demand, and so make Say's Law true in practice even though it was false in theory.

Such a policy of constant government intervention to continually rebalance aggregate demand is hardly a laissez-faire hands-off libertarian policy, is it?

Friedman, however, set about trying to maximize the rhetorical distance between his position--which was merely the "neutral," passive policy of maintaining the money stock growth rate at a constant--and the position of other macroeconomists, which was an "activist," interventionist policy of having the government disturb the natural workings of the free market. Something went wrong, Friedman claimed, only when a government stepped away from the "neutral" monetary policy of the constant growth rate rule and did something else.

It was, I think, that description of optimal monetary policy--not "the central bank has to be constantly intervening in order to offset shocks to cash demand by households and businesses, shocks to desired reserves on the part of banks, and shocks to the financial depth of the banking system" but "the central bank needs to keep its nose out of the economy, sit on its hands, and do nothing but maintain a constant growth rate for the money stock"--that set the stage for what was to follow in Chicago.

First, Friedman's rhetorical doctrine eliminated the cognitive dissonance between normal laissez-faire policies and optimal macro policy: both were "neutral" in the sense of the government "not interfering" with the natural equilibrium of the market. Second, Friedman's rhetorical doctrine eliminated all interesting macroeconomic questions: if the government followed the proper "neutral" policy, then there could be no macroeconomic problems. Third, generations of Chicago that had been weaned on this diet turned out to know nothing about macro and monetary issues when they became important again.

It is in this sense, I think, that I blame Milton Friedman: he sold the Chicago School an interventionist, technocratic, managerial optimal monetary policy under the pretense that it was something--laissez-faire--that it was not.

February Employment: Slightly Better

According to today's report from the BLS, the unemployment rate ticked down to 8.9% (from 9.0%) in February, and payrolls increased by 192,000.

Those are both solid improvements, though I had been hoping for better in light of other very positive recent data like the ISM index.

The labor force participation rate was unchanged at 64.2, so at least the decline in the unemployment rate was not driven by people leaving the labor force (to be counted as unemployed, a person must report that they are looking for work).  That is in contrast to the big decline in the unemployment rate in December and January, where declining participation was a major factor.

If the recovery gets stronger, the participation rate should be expected to start rising.

The unemployment rate and labor force participation rate are calculated from a survey of households, which reported an increase of 250,000 in the number of people employed (the payroll number cited above comes from the survey of businesses, which has a larger sample).  February is one of the months where the seasonal adjustment to the unemployment rate is downwards; on a non-seasonally adjusted basis, the unemployment rate was 9.5% (down from 9.8% in January).

The BLS also revised upward the payroll employment increase estimates for December, to 152,000 (from 121,000) and January, to 63,000 (from 36,000).  It may be that some of the February increase really occurred in January, but wasn't properly counted due to the weather in January - a rough way to correct for this is to look at the average of the two months, which is an unimpressive 127,500 (that's roughly the pace needed to keep the unemployment rate stable as the population grows).

Worth noting amid the sturm-und-drang over state budget cuts:

Employment in both state and local government edged down over the month. Local government has lost 377,000 jobs since its peak in September 2008.

U-6, the BLS' broadest measure of unemployment and underemployment, which includes people who are "marginally attached" to the labor force and those who are working part-time but want to work full-time stands at 15.9% (seasonally adjusted), down from 16.1% in January.

Update: More reactions/analysis from Mark Thoma, Paul Krugman, David Leonhardt, Floyd Norris, Calculated Risk, Free Exchange, Gavyn Davies and RTE's round up of Wall Street commentary.

Scientists vs Engineers?

The House Republicans' plan to cut federal spending by $61 billion for the remainder of the fiscal year (i.e., the period between now and the end of October) will be a drag on the economy and reduce employment, according to both Goldman Sachs and Moody's Mark Zandi, who says:

The House Republicans’ proposal would reduce 2011 real GDP growth by 0.5% and 2012 growth by 0.2 percentage points This would mean some 400,000 fewer jobs created by the end of 2011 and 700,000 fewer jobs by the end of 2012.

This shouldn't come to a surprise to macroeconomics students, who know that a decrease in government purchases reduces aggregate demand and - outside of the special "classical" case of vertical aggregate supply - output.

John Taylor disagrees, however.  Ezra Klein explains:

Mark Zandi says the GOP's proposed spending cuts will cost about 700,000 jobs. John Taylor says they will "increase economic growth and employment." Both are respected economists who immerse themselves in data, research and theory. So how can they disagree so sharply?

The dispute comes down to how much weight you give to "expectations" about future deficits. Taylor's argument is that Zandi's model -- which you can read more about here -- doesn't account for the upside of deficit reduction -- namely, that when the government spends less, the private sector will spend more. Taylor thinks individuals and businesses are hoarding their money because they're afraid of the high taxes, sharp spending cuts and assorted other nastiness that deficit reduction will eventually require. "The high unemployment we are experiencing now is due to low private investment rather than low government spending," he writes. "By reducing some uncertainty and the threats of exploding debt, the House spending proposal will encourage private investment."

A similar disagreement is playing out over monetary policy.  In a recent NY Times column, Christina Romer wrote:

The debate is between what I would describe as empiricists and theorists.

Empiricists, as the name suggests, put most weight on the evidence. Empirical analysis shows that the main determinants of inflation are past inflation and unemployment. Inflation rises when unemployment is below normal and falls when it is above normal.

Though there is much debate about what level of unemployment is now normal, virtually no one doubts that at 9 percent, unemployment is well above it. With core inflation running at less than 1 percent, empiricists are therefore relatively unconcerned about inflation in the current environment.

Theorists, on the other hand, emphasize economic models that assume people are highly rational in forming expectations of future inflation. In these models, Fed actions that call its commitment to low inflation into question can cause inflation expectations to spike, leading to actual increases in prices and wages. 

She sides with the "empiricists" and argues that the influence of the "theorists" has held the Fed back from taking bolder, more effective action.  Stephen Williamson begs to differ:

Romer says some things about economic history in her piece, but of course she is very selective, and seems to want to ignore the period in US economic history and in macroeconomic thought that runs from about 1968 to 1985. Let's review that. (i) Samuelson/Solow and others think that the Phillips curve is a structural relationship - a stable relationship between unemployment and inflation that represents a policy choice for the Fed. (ii) Friedman (in words) says that this is not so. There is no long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. It is possible to have high inflation and high unemployment. (iii) Macroeconomic events play out in a way consistent with what Friedman stated. We have high inflation and high unemployment. (iv) Lucas writes down a theory that makes rigorous what Friedman said. There are parts of the theory that we don't like so much now, but Lucas's work sets off a methodological revolution that changes how we do macroeconomics. 

The divides between Goldman/Zandi and Taylor over fiscal policy and between Romer and Williamson over monetary policy both reminded me of Greg Mankiw's distinction between "scientific" and "engineering" macroeconomics. The models used by the "engineers" - the people in Washington and on Wall Street who need to make practical, quantitative assessments of the impact of policy alternatives on the economy - are more elaborate versions of the "textbook" Keynesian IS-LM aggregate supply and demand framework that most of us (still) teach our macroeconomics students.  As Williamson points out, the models used by academics - Mankiw's "scientists" - in our research are fundamentally different.

The engineering models are built on relationships among aggregate macroeconomic variables like the Phillips curve, which relates inflation and unemployment, and the consumption function, which connects consumption and disposable income.  As Williamson alludes to, Robert Lucas and others won a methodological war in the profession (or at least the academic branch of it) in the 1970s and 1980s.  The result of their victory is that the macroeconomic models published in leading journals today are expected to be grounded in the optimizing, forward-looking behavior of rational individuals.

Such individuals might believe, for example, a reduction in government spending today implies that their future taxes will be lower (because the government will be servicing a smaller debt burden).  The resulting increase in their lifetime disposable income means that they will immediately increase their consumption.  So any negative impact of a cut in government purchases is offset by an increase in consumption.  Rational, forward-looking optimizers might also recognize that any monetary expansion will erode their real wages and demand an offsetting increase in nominal wages.  This means that employment will remain unchanged (because the real cost to the firms of a worker is the same) even as inflation rises.

At its most extreme, the assumption of dynamic optimization under rational expectations was once believed to imply the Lucas-Sargent "Policy Ineffectiveness" proposition, which Bennett McCallum explained in a 1980 Challenge article:

Macroeconomic policies - sustained patterns of action or reaction - will have no influence because they are perceived and taken into account by private decision-making agents. Thus, the adoption of a policy to maintain "full employment" will not, according to the present argument, result in values of the unemployment rate that are smaller (or less variable) on average than those that would be experienced in the absence of such a policy.

Of course, in a world of rationally optimizing people, where prices adjust to clear markets, it is hard to explain how we could get to such large deviations from the natural rate of unemployment in the first place...

More generally, while macroeconomic science has continued on the methodological path established by Lucas, many of its practitioners have worked to re-incorporate real effects of monetary policy.  This is a large part of the "New Keynesian" project, which is arguably now the reigning paradigm and best hope for reuniting "science" and "engineering" (and arguably is as much "monetarist" as it is "Keynesian").

Fiscal policy has received less attention - the implausibility of managing aggregate demand through the slow, cumbersome and messy budget process means that, in general, the focus has been on the Fed.

That has started to change as the global slump has pushed conventional monetary policy to its limits (and beyond into unknown worlds of unconventional policy), and governments around the world have made fitful attempts at fiscal policy.  For example, recent papers by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, Gauti Eggertson and Michael Woodford have shown that it is possible for fiscal policy to have significant multiplier effects when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound (as it is today) in New Keynesian models.

So, while, at a superficial level, it appears that the split between "scientists" and "engineers" persists, some of the "scientific" work being done today is finding that the remedies proposed by the "engineers" are not wholly inconsistent with forward-looking rational behavior after all.

Econ Journal Footnote of the Year

Foletti, L., Fugazza, M., Nicita, A. and Olarreaga, M. (2011), Smoke in the (Tariff) Water. The World Economy, 34: 248–264

9 The song ‘Smoke on the Water’ was written by Deep Purple and refers to the fire that took place at the Montreux Casino during Frank Zappa’s concert in the 1971 Festival. Montreux is at the opposite end of Lake Geneva from the WTO.

As the article explains, the gap between the tariff limits countries have agreed to under the WTO - "tariff bindings" - and the tariffs they actually impose is known as the "tariff water."  This means that, in practice, countries could raise many tariffs without violating their WTO commitments.  After accounting for tariff bindings that are above prohibitive levels and the constraints of regional trade agreements, the paper looks whether countries have used their available "policy space" to increase protection during the global recession (and finds that, generally, they haven't very much).

Or, one might say they decided not to go (Policy) Space Truckin'.

For a follow-up, might I suggest: Woman from (the) Tokyo (Round) ?

If you think you're not familiar with "Smoke on the Water," after the first 20 or so seconds of this you will realize that you are (its the holy trinity of rock).  Also: Space Truckin' and Woman from Tokyo.

Central Bank Independence

Ben Bernanke's British counterpart, Mervyn King, is taking alot of heat for supporting the government's harsh package of spending cuts and tax increases.  Paul Krugman writes:

Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, has stepped way over the line by turning into a cheerleader for the current government’s policies. He’s wrong on the economics — front-loaded spending cuts are the wrong policy for a still-depressed economy — but that’s not the key point; rather, the point is that if you’re going to have an independent central bank, the people running that bank have to be careful to stay above the political fray.

A Guardian story quotes Ed Balls, the Labour party shadow chancellor (i.e., the opposition's point person on economic policy):

"The last thing you ever want is for the Bank of England to be drawn into the political arena," said Balls, who was involved in Labour's move in 1997 to give the Bank independence to set interest rates. "Central bank governors have to be very careful about tying themselves too closely to fiscal strategies, especially when they are extreme and are making their job on monetary policy more complicated."

One of the things that comes with central bank independence is the expectation that central bankers should be neutral technocrats who keep a narrow focus on monetary policy.  In part, this is because central bank independence is a fragile thing, which could be undone by a change to the Federal Reserve Act in the US, or, in the UK, the Bank of England Act.  While respect for the principle of central bank independence - exemplified by the fact that Greenspan and Bernanke, both Republicans, were re-nominated by Democratic presidents - has evolved over time, it could be eroded if the central bank was seen to be a partisan actor.

However, I have a bit more sympathy for Governor King than Krugman and Balls do.  Central bankers face a dilemma because, while they are rightly expected to stay out of "politics" generally, fiscal policy and monetary policy are interdependent.  The central bank is responsible for one part of a fiscal and monetary "policy mix," and its decisions depend on (and are constrained by) the government's tax and spending decisions, and vice-versa. 

In the UK, the Bank of England is accommodating "tight" fiscal policy with "loose" monetary policy.  To a slightly less dramatic degree, this also occurred between the Clinton administration and the Greenspan Fed in the early 1990's.  The early 1980's saw the opposite mix in the US: simultaneously tight monetary policy and loose fiscal policy.  While the monetary tightening was seen as necessary to bring inflation under control, it probably wouldn't have had to have been so severe if the Reagan administration's tax cuts and spending increases weren't occuring at the same time.

Since the ultimate impact of a fiscal policy depends on how monetary policy will react, the political system, in theory, could make better-informed decisions if the central bank communicated its views and intentions.  Moreover, because monetary policy has to react to fiscal policy, it is arguably legitimate for the central bank to have preferences about it.

The argument Krugman and Balls are making implies that the benefits from a more explicit coordination of monetary and fiscal policy, which requires central banks to speak about fiscal policy, is outweighed by the damage to central bank independence that occurs when central bankers like King express themselves on "political" tax and spending matters.

A Real Appreciation for China (Cont'd)

Another day brings more evidence that inflation in China may be taking care of the undervalued renminbi problem (see this previous post).

The Economist:

In adjusting current accounts, what matters is the real exchange rate (which takes account of relative inflation rates at home and abroad). Movements in nominal exchange rates often do not achieve the desired adjustment in real rates because they may be offset by changing domestic prices. For example, the yen’s trade-weighted value is around 150% stronger than it was in 1985. Yet Japan’s current-account surplus remains big because that appreciation has been largely offset by a fall in domestic Japanese wholesale prices, so exporters remain competitive.

An alternative way to lift a real exchange rate is through higher inflation than abroad. To an American buyer, a 5% increase in the yuan price of Chinese exports is the same as a 5% appreciation of the yuan against the dollar.

Fred Bergsten (interviewed by Michael Casey):

The real [inflation-adjusted] renmimbi exchange rate has appreciated against the dollar at an annual rate of about 12% since last June, although considerably less on a trade-weighted basis. The dollar has fallen against most other currencies, so on a trade-weighted basis, the renmimbi has risen less. On the other hand, one has to accept that the Chinese think of this totally in dollar terms. So the dollar exchange rate is a legitimate focus for them, and if you believe that the dollar is going to bounce around and come back over time it will drag the renmimbi back up with it [against those other currencies.]

They have been letting [the real exchange rate] go up an average of 10 to 12% on an annual basis so it’s fair to say that if they would let that continue for another couple of years they would achieve a restoration of underlying equilibrium in the exchange rate. That would take away most, if not all, of the distortions that their persistent interventions have created....

[G]iven China’s history of hyperinflation, it would be far better to adjust via the nominal rate. It has always surprised me that they seem to prefer to do part of it through inflation. And now that they are really worried about inflation, which has become the focal point of their economic policy, this would be the perfect time for them to let the currency adjust. They know the currency is going to adjust over time anyway and it is better to let it happen through the nominal rate. At the same time, it’s an ideal time for us if they make the move now because it will help rebalance our external accounts and help deal with our high unemployment. From the standpoint of both sides there couldn’t be a better time to adjust the nominal exchange rate for the renmimbi.

See also Bergsten's commentary "A Breakthrough on the Renminbi?" at the Peterson Institute's blog.

The Savings Glut, Revisited

In a speech on "Global Imbalances" today in Paris, Ben Bernanke revisited the "savings glut" hypothesis he offered in 2005.  The current account balance (CA) is the difference between investment (I) and net national saving (NS):

 CA = NS-I

A current account deficit occurs when investment is greater than domestic saving - the gap is filled by selling assets to the rest of the world.

Although it is commonplace to criticize deficit countries for low savings - and the savings rate in the US did indeed become very low - Bernanke argued in 2005 that the US current account deficit was driven by foreign savings.  The financial inflows stemming from the foreign "savings glut" drove up the prices of US assets (including bonds, thereby driving down interest rates), and the decline in US savings followed from the resultant increase in wealth.

As a share of GDP, the US current account deficit peaked at just over 6% of GDP in early 2006.

I today's speech, Bernanke cites evidence that there was strong international demand for "safe" US assets, which supports his 2005 hypothesis.

He is careful not to blame the financial inflows for the crisis.  The failure was how the US dealt with them.  This has a parallel to the 1997 Asian financial crisis:

The preferences of foreign investors for highly rated U.S. assets, together with similar preferences by many domestic investors, had a number of implications, including for the relative yields on such assets. Importantly, though, the preference by so many investors for perceived safety created strong incentives for U.S. financial engineers to develop investment products that "transformed" risky loans into highly rated securities. Remarkably, even though a large share of new U.S. mortgages during the housing boom were of weak credit quality, financial engineering resulted in the overwhelming share of private-label mortgage-related securities being rated AAA. The underlying contradiction was, of course, ultimately exposed, at great cost to financial stability and the global economy.

To be clear, these findings are not to be read as assigning responsibility for the breakdown in U.S. financial intermediation to factors outside the United States. Instead, in analogy to the Asian crisis, the primary cause of the breakdown was the poor performance of the financial system and financial regulation in the country receiving the capital inflows, not the inflows themselves. In the case of the United States, sources of poor performance included misaligned incentives in mortgage origination, underwriting, and securitization; risk-management deficiencies among financial institutions; conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies; weaknesses in the capitalization and incentive structures of the government-sponsored enterprises; gaps and weaknesses in the financial regulatory structure; and supervisory failures.

Ouch.  That's harsh, though he could take the Asia analogy one step further - as Simon Johnson does - and acknowledge that the "breakdown" in the US was partly because we have our own form of "crony capitalism" where the financial industry has, to a degree, captured the regulatory and political system.

Bernanke also has an uncomfortable analogy for the surplus countries that are not allowing their currencies to appreciate:

These issues are hardly new. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the U.S. dollar and French franc were undervalued, with the result that both countries experienced current account surpluses and strong capital inflows. Under the unwritten but long-standing rules of the gold standard, those two countries would have been expected to allow the inflows to feed through to domestic money supplies and prices, leading to real appreciations of their currencies and, with time, to a narrowing of their external surpluses. Instead, the two nations sterilized the effects of these capital inflows on their money supplies, so that their currencies remained persistently undervalued. Under the constraints imposed by the gold standard, these policies in turn increased deflationary pressures and banking-sector strains in deficit countries such as Germany, which were losing gold and foreign deposits. Ultimately, the unwillingness of the United States and France to conduct their domestic policies by the rules of the game, together with structural vulnerabilities in financial systems and in the gold standard itself, helped destabilize the global economic and financial system and bring on the Great Depression. 

In his central banker-ly caution, he refuses to name names, but he's obviously alluding to China's policy of keeping renminbi undervalued. 

Although he has a knack for giving very comprehensive speeches sometimes, there are some important closely-related issues that Bernanke did not touch on this time.  In particular, the demand for US assets was partly due to the fact that the dollar is the most widely-used "reserve currency" (i.e., held in official portfolios).  This periodically generates complaints from the rest of the world (and for the US, its a mixed blessing), but Bernanke did not point to any alternative.  Nor did he suggest that it gives the US any special responsibility (and, personally, I don't believe that it does).  Also, one significant motive for reserve accumulation is self-insurance - countries burned by reliance on inflows of foreign savings decided to build up their own.  An better international insurance mechanism would reduce that need.  In theory, that is part of what the IMF is supposed to provide.

Update: A nice response to the gold standard analogy from Free Exchange.

Who Needs Paris?

Not us lucky denizens of Middletown, CT, according to the National Trust for Historic Places.  At the top of their list of "Most Romantic Main Streets":

Middletown, Connecticut. Middletown’s allure includes an artful Main Street brimming with elegant restaurants, an award-winning local chocolatier, and the romantic Inn at Middletown, offering the best of New England charm.

Not to mention the drama of our collapsing buildings!

The Big Squeeze on Little G

When I introduce the GDP figures to my macroeconomics students, I point out that the federal government accounts for a much smaller portion of the economy than many believe.  Federal government purchases - i.e., the federal part of G in the national income accounts - was 8.3% of GDP in 2010, and more than two-thirds of that was military spending.  The federal nondefense part - all the stuff that we think of as "the federal government" like the FBI, NASA, the State Dept. and so on - was a mere 2.7% of GDP.

One reason that people think that the federal government is larger is that federal spending was $3.7 trillion last year, which would be 26.5% of GDP.  But most of that is transfer payments - money sent to people (and, to a lesser extent, state governments).  Mainly, this is social security and medicare.  In the national income accounts, most transfers end up in the "C" (consumption) component of GDP when the recipients spend the money.

The chart below, from BEA data, illustrates that nondefense federal government purchases are only about 10% of federal spending.

That is, the turquoise pie slice is $396.6 out of $3890.6 billion.

So when zealous congressional republicans say that they are going to cut our "big government" by $100 billion*, the consequences are quite severe because the cuts almost entirely come out of that small slice.  This analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities provides some of the bloody details, including cuts of 12.7% in Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, 14.5% in Interior and Environment and 26.1% in Transportation and Housing and Urban Development.

*It depends on how you measure it; as the CBPP analysis explains, the "$100 billion" figure is relative to the president's proposal and is for an entire fiscal year (which runs from October through September), while the cuts are for the remainder of fiscal 2011.

The CBPP analysis comes to my attention via the invaluable Ezra Klein.

Update: Paul Krugman has more. 
Update #2: So does Bruce Bartlett.