Looking for a Job?

The current economic environment may be discouraging to college seniors (and others) looking for a job, but here is some good news: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is hiring. They expect to be busy with more bank failures.

A Run on the Shadow Banking System

Paul Krugman sees parallels between the current problems in the financial sector and banking crises of the depression. In his latest column, he writes:

But sometimes — often based on nothing more than a rumor — banks face runs, in which many people try to withdraw their money at the same time. And a bank that faces a run by depositors, lacking the cash to meet their demands, may go bust even if the rumor was false.

Worse yet, bank runs can be contagious. If depositors at one bank lose their money, depositors at other banks are likely to get nervous, too, setting off a chain reaction. And there can be wider economic effects: as the surviving banks try to raise cash by calling in loans, there can be a vicious circle in which bank runs cause a credit crunch, which leads to more business failures, which leads to more financial troubles at banks, and so on.

That, in brief, is what happened in 1930-1931, making the Great Depression the disaster it was. So Congress tried to make sure it would never happen again by creating a system of regulations and guarantees that provided a safety net for the financial system.

In recent years, the financial sector has increasingly found ways to evade those safeguards (generally with Washington's acquiescence) and a large portion of activity occurs outside of the commercial banking sector:

Wall Street chafed at regulations that limited risk, but also limited potential profits. And little by little it wriggled free — partly by persuading politicians to relax the rules, but mainly by creating a “shadow banking system” that relied on complex financial arrangements to bypass regulations designed to ensure that banking was safe.

For example, in the old system, savers had federally insured deposits in tightly regulated savings banks, and banks used that money to make home loans. Over time, however, this was partly replaced by a system in which savers put their money in funds that bought asset-backed commercial paper from special investment vehicles that bought collateralized debt obligations created from securitized mortgages — with nary a regulator in sight.

As the years went by, the shadow banking system took over more and more of the banking business, because the unregulated players in this system seemed to offer better deals than conventional banks. Meanwhile, those who worried about the fact that this brave new world of finance lacked a safety net were dismissed as hopelessly old-fashioned.

In fact, however, we were partying like it was 1929 — and now it’s 1930.

The financial crisis currently under way is basically an updated version of the wave of bank runs that swept the nation three generations ago. People aren’t pulling cash out of banks to put it in their mattresses — but they’re doing the modern equivalent, pulling their money out of the shadow banking system and putting it into Treasury bills. And the result, now as then, is a vicious circle of financial contraction.

The Fed has responded by broadening its lender of last resort function to allow investment banks as well as commercial banks to borrow and to accept a wider range of securities (including mortgage backed securities) as collateral. The investment banks ("primary dealers") will be able to borrow from the new Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) - in essence, the Fed is opening the discount window to them. This comes in addition to the loans made available through the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), announced the week before.

Although there are parallels with the banking crises of the 1930's, in the Times, Charles Duhigg explains that a repeat of the depression is unlikely. Partly this is because the structure of the economy has changed - in particular, government plays a much larger role in the economy now, acting as an "automatic stabilizer." Furthermore, economists (and policymakers) have learned some lessons, as evidenced the Fed's quick response (in his professor days, Ben Bernanke was a prominent scholar of the depression). [A minor factual error in the story: the highest unemployment rate of the postwar period was 10.8%, at the end of 1982].

Meanwhile, Congress is looking at updating regulation of the financial sector.

A Note From Adam Smith

Salon columnist Glenn Greenwald found the following nugget in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Smith wrote:

In great empires the people who live in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene of action, feel, many of them, scarce any inconveniency from the war; but enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and armies. To them this amusement compensates the small difference between the taxes which they pay on account of the war, and those which they had been accustomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly dissatisfied with the return of peace, which puts an end to their amusement, and to a thousand visionary hopes of conquest and national glory from a longer continuance of the war.

Remind you of anyone? (Hat tip: Brad de Long)

Is the Midwest Boring?

Yes, and we like it that way:

House Prices (1995 = 100)

That is from Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight's House Price Index. Apparently little pink houses are less prone to bubbles.

McCain-omics

Jared Bernstein examines the McCain economic agenda. (As Bernstein notes, McCain seems more comfortable talking about foreign policy than economic policy, but maybe he shouldn't be so sure of himself).

War Costs

The Iraq war is five years old today. Considering the incalculable human costs of the enterprise, there is something almost unseemly about discussing the economic costs, but those are far from trivial.

The Financial Times reports on several different estimates of the war's costs. Economics Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has co-authored a book on the subject, "The Three Trillion Dollar War." He chatted with washingtonpost.com readers today (see also this op-ed with his co-author Linda Blimes).

One interesting point that came up in his discussion was the notion of "opportunity cost" -

San Francisco, Calif.: A trillion here, a trillion there, pretty soon we'll be talking about real money.

Could you address the opportunity costs of the war? For example, health care reform is a major issue in the presidential election, and three million dollars could've gone a long way towards funding it. Social Security is another example.

Joseph E. Stiglitz: That is the right way of asking the question. As a rich country, we can, in some sense, "afford" the war. But spending money on the war means that we are not spending money on other things that we could have spent the money on.

One of the real costs of the war is that our security is actually less than it otherwise would have been (ironic, since enhancing security was one of the reasons for going to war). Our armed forces have been depleted--we have been wearing out equipment and using up munitions faster than we have been replacing them; the armed forces face difficult problems in recruitment--by any objective measures,including those used by the armed forces, quality has deteriorated significantly.

Economically, we are gain weaker. Millions of americans have no health insurance--including many poor children. if they do not get the care they need, they may become scarred for life; but the President vetoed the children's health insurance bill--evidently we couldn't afford it. But we were talking about just a few days fighting in Iraq.

The list of what we could have done with just a month or even a few days fighting in Iraq is long. These are called the opportunity costs of the war. In our book, we give many examples of these opportunity costs.

Opportunity cost is a good concept for thinking the decisions of utility-maximizing agents - when a choice is made, the opportunity cost is the next best alternative which is forgone. However, that may not be a good way of understanding the outcomes of our political process. The Tax Policy Center's Howard Gleckman tried to be realistic about where the money would have gone:

Here is a little thought experiment. Had there been no occupation, we would have had a balanced budget by fiscal 2007. The deficit was $162 billion, almost exactly equal to the direct cost of the war that year. Factor in other foregone costs, such as the expense of caring for wounded vets and the like, and we probably would have had a modest surplus.

And what would we have done with it? This is just speculation, of course, but if Stiglitz can do it so can I. The White House would have said, "We have balanced the budget, so let's extend the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts." Congressional Democrats would have said, "We have a balanced budget, let's extend the SCHIP child health program." And, in the end, they may very well have done a little of both. But long-term entitlement fixes? I don't think so.

Since taxes were not raised to finance the war, the financial burden ultimately takes the form of higher government debt. That will mean taxes in the future will be higher than otherwise in order to pay the interest (currently more than 8 cents of every federal spending dollar goes to interest), and having those costs locked into the budget may hinder a future administration in addressing other issues. Moreover, the government's borrowing contributes to our current account deficit and a significant portion of the future interest payments will be made to foreign creditors. This last point means that some of our future output will generate income for foreigners rather than Americans (i.e. GNP will be less relative to GDP).

Update (3/19): The Times also looks at estimating war costs.

Professor Jones and the Committee of Doom?

Inside Higher Ed reports:

...Blowtorch Entertainment will next month begin filming on “Tenure,” which is about a college professor coming up for tenure (Luke Wilson) and facing off against a female rival who recently arrived at (fictional) Grey College. (The part of the institution will be played by Bryn Mawr College, where the movie will be shot.) David Koechner will play the professorial sidekick to the Wilson character, and the production company is planning kickoff events next year to promote the film in college towns.

Brendan McDonald, the producer, said that he viewed academe as “one of the interesting worlds to explore” and said that he viewed the project as “lampooning the tenure process.”

Hmmm... the tenure process certainly could use some lampooning. Its hard to see that doing well at the box office, but I'll go see it. Then again, maybe I should wait and rent it after I get tenure. OK, back to work...

Steven Colbert: Lose Hope to Gain Confidence

The number of people working fell last month, but the unemployment rate declined (see earlier post). Steven Colbert explains:

The Economics of the Iraq Insurgency

Many countries abundant in natural resources have been development failures. This apparent paradox is sometimes called the "resource curse." In part it is attributable to the opportunities for corruption created by abundant resources and the incentives that exist for diverting effort away from productive activity into fighting - often literally - over the rents associated with resources like oil and diamonds.

The the persistence of the insurgency in Iraq may be another manifestation of the resource curse. The NY Times reports that oil money is fueling the violence:

The sea of oil under Iraq is supposed to rebuild the nation, then make it prosper. But at least one-third, and possibly much more, of the fuel from Iraq’s largest refinery here is diverted to the black market, according to American military officials. Tankers are hijacked, drivers are bribed, papers are forged and meters are manipulated — and some of the earnings go to insurgents who are still killing more than 100 Iraqis a week.

“It’s the money pit of the insurgency,” said Capt. Joe Da Silva, who commands several platoons stationed at the refinery.

Five years after the war in Iraq began, the insurgency remains a lethal force. The steady flow of cash is one reason, even as the American troop buildup and the recruitment of former insurgents to American-backed militias have helped push the number of attacks down to 2005 levels.

In fact, money, far more than jihadist ideology, is a crucial motivation for a majority of Sunni insurgents, according to American officers in some Sunni provinces and other military officials in Iraq who have reviewed detainee surveys and other intelligence on the insurgency....

“It has a great deal more to do with the economy than with ideology,” said one senior American military official, who said that studies of detainees in American custody found that about three-quarters were not committed to the jihadist ideology. “The vast majority have nothing to do with the caliphate and the central ideology of Al Qaeda.”

For more on the resource curse, see this column by Tyler Cowen in the Times last year.

Wall Street, There's a Place You Can Go

I said, Wall Street, when you're short on your dough...

Earlier this week, the Fed announced a new $200 billion program called the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). This will allow investment banks to borrow US Treasury securities by putting up certain assets including some mortgage-backed securities as collateral. The NY Times reported:

The Federal Reserve, in effect, is trying to ease an acute credit squeeze by agreeing to hold large volumes of mortgage-backed bonds that Wall Street firms are struggling to sell and providing them with either cash or Treasury securities that they can immediately convert to cash.

Fed officials are increasingly convinced that the United States is sliding into a recession, and they worry that the deepening credit squeeze will aggravate the problem by making it even harder for consumers and businesses to borrow money for houses, new equipment or new factories.

The Fed’s hope is to relieve some of the pressure on institutions to sell at fire-sale prices, easing the strains on economic activity and making the credit markets feel more comfortable in buying mortgage bonds again.

The Washington Post's Steven Pearlstein puts the Fed's action in context:

[T]he real problem began in late February, as several of Wall Street's biggest investment banks prepared to close their books for the quarter and realized they were looking not only at big declines in profit from issuance of new stocks and bonds and fees from mergers and acquisitions, but also another round of write-offs in the value of their holdings. In response, the banks began to hunker down, instructing their trading desks to raise margin requirements for hedge funds and other customers, requiring them, in effect, to post more collateral on their heavy borrowings.

Thus began a chain reaction in which hedge funds began selling what they could -- largely mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae -- to raise the cash to meet their new margin calls. That wave of forced selling drove down the price of those bonds, which prompted more margin calls and more forced selling. By the end of last week, the interest rate spread on those securities -- the difference between their yield and that of risk-free U.S. Treasury bonds -- had jumped four, five, even 10 times the normal rate.

(Here is an explanation of "margin call").

A central bank is sometimes called upon to act as a "lender of last resort" to banks in crisis. In an age where loans are widely "securitized" - that is, instead of sitting as an asset on a bank's balance sheet, loans are sold on a market (often in a bundle like a mortgage-backed security which entitles the holders to the payments from the underlying mortgage loans) - Willem Buiter has argued that the central bank needs to be a "market maker of last resort." A market maker acts as both a buyer and a seller (not unlike a used car lot), and thereby ensures "liquidity" - that assets can readily be sold. Buiter sees the TSLF as a sign that the Fed is stepping up to this task (albeit in a somewhat indirect fashion):

The old Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) model of providing funding liquidity to solvent but illiquid banks, at a penalty rate and against collateral that would be good in normal times but may have become impaired in disorderly market conditions, may be appropriate in a relationships-based financial system or traditional banking system. It is not capable of dealing with market illiquidity - the kind of liquidity problem likely to arise in a transactions-based model of financial capitalism, that is, a system in which a large share of intermediation occurs through the capital markets rather than through conventional ‘originate and hold’ banks.

In a transactions-based financial system, the Market Maker of Last Resort function complements or even substitutes for the Lender of Last Resort function as the instrument of choice for pursuing financial stability. Rather than disguising the fact that the Fed has woken up to the fact that the world has changed and that central banks have to accept an expanded range of eligible collateral from an expanded range of counterparties when key financial market seize up, the Fed should advertise the fact. They are doing the right thing.

No bank does it all by itself.
I said, Wall Street, put your pride on the shelf,
And just go there, to the T.S.L.F.
I'm sure they can help you today.

Update: Paul Krugman believes it probably won't work.